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“NOT TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION
SOURCES”: JOURNALISTIC PRIVILEGE
UNDER ARTICLE 19 OF ICCPR
EDWARD L. CARTER*

International law took a significant step in recent years toward protection of
journalists’ sources and newsgathering processes. The international law
journalistic privilege previously had been upheld by international tribunals, but it
was not until 2011 that the United Nations Human Rights Committee adopted an
interpretation of freedom of expression that included journalistic privilege. The
presence of the privilege within freedom of expression, as recognized in Article 19
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is important for
several reasons. As part of freedom of expression, the privilege may not be
overcome without a showing of necessity and proportionality, is not subject to a
margin of appreciation, and is entitled to full realization by the 168 nations that
have signed and ratified ICCPR.

Following years of efforts by government prosecutors and private litigants to
obtain journalists’ evidence in a variety of international and foreign legal proceedings,
the United Nations Human Rights Committee formally endorsed a journalistic privilege
in 2011.1 As parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (known
as ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee said, that nations “should recognize and
respect that element of the right of freedom of expression that embraces the limited
journalistic privilege not to disclose information sources.”2 In establishing the standard,
the committee did not reference journalistic privilege cases — discussed below — that
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were previously decided in regional human-rights tribunals. Instead, the committee
referred to its own commentary, in July 2000, on the human-rights record of Kuwait.3
That country, the committee wrote, had failed to protect journalists from being
compelled to “reveal their sources” in legal proceedings, which the committee said could
be in violation of Kuwait’s obligations under Article 19 of ICCPR.4 The committee tied
its concern for protection of journalists’ sources in Kuwait to other restrictions on
journalists in that country, including the government closing a newspaper, banning books,
and prosecuting and imprisoning authors and journalists in legal proceedings that placed
the burden on them to prove good faith or innocence. These actions, the committee said,
did not appear to be compatible with Article 19’s requirement that any restrictions on
freedom of expression be justified as both necessary to accomplish a legitimate
government objective and proportional to societal need.5
Since 1966, 168 nations around the world, including the United States, have
signed and ratified ICCPR, thus binding themselves to an international law standard that
now clearly protects reporter’s privilege within the freedom of expression. Article 19
allows restrictions on this right only in case of conflict with the rights or reputations of
others, need for protection of national security or public order, or to preserve public
health or morals.6 Even if one of those rights is asserted, national officials bear the
burden to demonstrate the restriction on reporter’s privilege is provided by law, necessary
and proportional. Given the committee’s endorsement of journalistic privilege, any of the
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into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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168 nations that lack a reporter’s privilege protection, or that fail to ensure its
enforcement in line with the standard above, could be in violation of international law.
This article examines the state of the privilege as described by the Human Rights
Committee in its formal interpretation of ICCPR’s Article 19. That interpretation came
in a document called “General Comment 34.” This article argues that General Comment
34 is critically important to development of the international law journalistic privilege,
and this importance has yet to be fully recognized in scholarship and jurisprudence.
Although it is so-called soft law,7 General Comment 34 represents an important step in
the continuing development of the international law journalistic privilege. First, the
article reviews previous scholarly work and judicial treatment of the international law
privilege. Second, the article assesses the state of protections for newsgathering within
the U.N. Human Rights Committee, and the U.N. generally, prior to the committee’s
adoption of General Comment 34. Next, the article discusses General Comment 34’s
conception of the privilege in the context of its discussion about journalism. An
important part of this discussion involves the international-law ramifications of defining
the journalistic privilege as a human right. Three of these ramifications deal with the
necessity and proportionality test of ICCPR Article 19(3), the margin of appreciation and
the state responsibility to protect, respect and fulfill the right. Then this article examines
some likely future issues about the privilege in the international law context, and among

7
One author describes soft law as “a doctrine of international law that describes the legal status of
certain human rights related declarations, resolutions, guidelines, and basic principles.” H. VICTOR CONDÉ,
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 242 (2004). Although non-binding, soft
law standards are nonetheless important because they are “highly recommended standards of state conduct
that should be followed” and because they “serve as a guideline or road map to how to comply with ‘hard
law’ human rights norms, such as those found in ICCPR.” Id.
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the issues are challenges presented by anti-terrorism legislation, increased government
surveillance and advances in technology. Finally, the article offers a brief conclusion.

SCHOLARLY AND JUDICIAL VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNALISTIC PRIVILEGE
The reporter’s privilege in the United States has been the subject of extensive
scholarship ever since the Supreme Court of the United States decided Branzburg v.
Hayes8 more than four decades ago.9 Although Branzburg’s meaning has been the
subject of much debate, one thing appears clear: A right for journalists to maintain the
confidentiality of their sources in case of a grand jury’s criminal investigation does not
exist in the United States. That much was placed beyond dispute when the former New
York Times reporter Judith Miller spent eighty-five days in jail in 2005 and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected her claim of journalistic privilege.10 That
is not to say the journalist’s privilege in the United States is non-existing, given the
presence of approximately forty state shield laws, the common law, and Department of
Justice regulatory guidelines.11 Any extended analysis of U.S. law is beyond the scope of
this article, but examination of the international law privilege is relevant to U.S. legal
scholars, legal practitioners and journalists because the United States is a party to ICCPR
and thus bound to apply the journalistic privilege in its Article 19.

8

408 U.S. 665 (1972).
The scholarship is too varied and deep to discuss in a meaningful way here, but some
representative articles that reference many others are RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s
Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1221 (2013); Paul Marcus, The Reporter’s Privilege: An Analysis of the
Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (1984);
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515 (2007);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39 (2005).
10
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See sources cited at supra note 9.
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The journalistic privilege also has been discussed in the context of various other
countries as well.12 This article, however, focuses only on journalistic privilege in
international law, not U.S., foreign or comparative law. The discussion begins with
several cases that are, by now, well known in international law literature about
journalistic privilege and others that are less prominent.

Goodwin v. United Kingdom and Other European Court of Human Rights
Cases
The European Court of Human Rights held in 1996 that the government of Great
Britain had violated the free-expression rights of a journalist by compelling him to
disclose the identity of a confidential source that had leaked a private company’s
financial documents.13 The journalist, William Goodwin, worked for a business
publication named The Engineer and received an internal company document indicating
that a software company called Tetra was in financial difficulty. After Goodwin asked
the company to comment for publication, Tetra obtained a British court injunction against
publication. The court also ordered Goodwin to disclose the identity of his source so
Tetra could pursue action against whomever took one of eight numbered copies of the
confidential document from an accountants’ meeting room.14 The disclosure order was

12

See, e.g., Noah Goldstein, An International Assessment of Journalist Privileges and Source
Confidentiality, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 103 (2007) (discussing Canada, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Australia and various European countries); Kyu Ho
Youm, International and Comparative Law on the Journalist’s Privilege: The Randal Case as a Lesson for
the American Press, 1 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT L. 1 (2006) (discussing Argentina, Australia,
Canada, El Salvador, Germany, Japan, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United Kingdom). For a
discussion of the privilege in the context of international reporting by American reporters under U.S. law,
see Lisa Kloppenberg, Disclosure of Confidential Sources in International Reporting, 60 S.CAL. L. REV.
1631 (1987).
13
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1996).
14
Id. at ¶ 11.
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eventually upheld by an intermediate appellate court and the House of Lords. Goodwin
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights on the basis that the order violated his
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The European Court concluded that the order of disclosure was not necessary in a
democratic society because the injunction against publication already sufficiently
protected the company’s interests.15 In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged
the value to society of protecting journalists from compelled disclosure:

Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom.
. . . Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in
informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital publicwatchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to
provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.16

The European Court of Human Rights subsequently continued to protect
journalists’ sources in various ways. For example, in 2007 the court held that Belgium
had violated the free-expression right of a journalist when the police confiscated the
journalist’s files and newsgathering materials in an attempt to discover his sources for
reporting on activities of European Union officials.17 In another case, the court
articulated the high bar that must be met by those seeking to discover journalists’
confidential sources. Several newspapers in the U.K. published the details of a

15

Id. at ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶ 39.
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See Tillack v. Belgium, No. 20477/05 (2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00183527 (last visited May 17, 2017).
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confidential document relating to a proposed merger between competitors in the brewing
industry. Ultimately, the court rejected an attempt by one of the companies to force
disclosure of the source’s identity because, the court held, the company’s interest in
obtaining damages from the source and in deterring future leaks did not outweigh the
public interest in journalistic privilege.18
The European Court of Human Rights’ Grand Chamber gave a strong
endorsement of journalistic privilege in 2010 along with a detailed explanation of the
rationale behind the privilege.19 The case stemmed from police confiscation of a
magazine’s digital copies of photographs of an illegal street race, whose organizers had
been promised anonymity by the journalists taking the photos. The Grand Chamber
wrote strongly in favor of the “public watchdog” role of the press and the importance of
protecting journalistic sources as part of the freedom of expression, specifically gathering
and publishing news.20 The court clearly articulated the harms that follow forced
disclosure of journalistic sources and newsgathering materials:

The Court notes that orders to disclose sources potentially have a detrimental
impact, not only on the source, whose identity may be revealed, but also on the
newspaper or other publication against which the order is directed, whose
reputation may be negatively affected in the eyes of future potential sources by

18
Financial Times Ltd. & Others v. United Kingdom, No. 821/03 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-96157&filename=001-96157.pdf
(last visited May 17, 2017).
19
Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, No. 38224/03 (2010), available at
http://www.onebrickcourt.com/files/cases/echr_76144.pdf (last visited May 17, 2017).
20
Id. at ¶ 50.
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the disclosure, and on members of the public, who have an interest in receiving
information imparted through anonymous sources.21

The Grand Chamber concluded there had been a human-rights violation and
ordered the Netherlands to pay the journalists’ legal fees and costs. The European Court
of Human Rights later concluded the Netherlands had violated the free-expression rights
of another set of journalists when the country’s surveillance apparatus was used to
surreptitiously seek to uncover the journalists’ sources — government leakers — for
articles about covert investigations.22 The court noted especially the need for prior
review of the appropriateness of government surveillance of journalists because the
government “cannot restore the confidentiality of journalistic sources once it is
destroyed.”23

Randal Case
Six years after the European Court of Human Rights decision in Goodwin v.
United Kingdom, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (known as ICTY) referenced Goodwin in addressing the novel issue
of whether a war correspondent could invoke the journalistic privilege even though the
correspondent did not claim to have a confidential source.24 The Washington Post
journalist Jonathan Randal received a subpoena to testify in the ICTY prosecution of

21

Id.
Telegraaf Media Nederland and Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. The Netherlands, No.
39315/06 (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-114439 (last visited May 17, 2017).
23
Id. at ¶ 101.
24
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin & Momir Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9 (Decision of the
Appeals Chamber on Interlocutory Appeal) (2002), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acdec/en/randall021211.htm (last visited October 24, 2016).
22
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Radoslav Brdjanin, a Serb nationalist and housing administrator who was charged with
crimes against humanity. Randal had interviewed Brdjanin and reported in the Post that
Brdjanin advocated the forced removal of Muslims and Croats. Prosecutors sought to
introduce Randal’s article as evidence against Brdjanin, but Brdjanin claimed the article
was inaccurately reported. The prosecution obtained a subpoena to compel Randal’s
testimony, and the Trial Chamber of ICTY granted the subpoena against Randal’s
protest.25
However, the appeals chamber concluded that war correspondents such as Randal
were entitled to journalistic privilege even when they did not claim to have confidential
sources. The journalists, the court held, served the public interest because “vigorous
investigation and reporting by war correspondents enables citizens of the international
community to receive vital information from war zones.”26 While the court cited Article
19 of ICCPR as a basis for the privilege, this was done in context of the public’s right to
receive information, and the journalist’s newsgathering and free expression
considerations were somewhat de-emphasized.27 Further, the court concluded that war
correspondents’ effectiveness could be hampered by compelled testimony even if there
were no confidential sources: “[W]ar correspondents must be perceived as independent
observers rather than as potential witnesses for the Prosecution. Otherwise, they may
face more frequent and grievous threats to their safety and to the safety of their
sources.”28

25

Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.
Id. at ¶ 38.
27
Id. at ¶ 37.
28
Id. at ¶ 42.
26
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In the unique context of war reporting, then, the distinction between confidential
and non-confidential sources matters little. While acknowledging the importance of
obtaining relevant evidence, the ICTY concluded that a war correspondent can be
compelled to testify in a prosecution only if the journalist’s testimony is “direct and
important to the core issues of the case” and there are no other reasonable alternatives to
obtain the information.29 Subsequent to the Randal case, this test has been used by other
international law tribunals, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.30 International law scholars have suggested
the same privilege could apply in the International Criminal Court, although the ICC
actually declined an invitation to include journalistic privilege in its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence.31

Scholarly Reaction to the Goodwin and Randal Cases
Several scholars have discussed the Goodwin and Randal cases. Kyu Ho Youm,
for example, concluded that while American constitutional law provided the basis for the
decisions’ rationale, American courts had actually been reluctant to go as far as the
European Court and the ICTY in protecting journalistic privilege.32 American courts,
Youm suggested, would do well to follow the developing international law of journalistic

29

Id. at ¶¶ 48-50.
See Karim A.A. Khan & Gissou Azarnia, Evidential Privileges, in KARIM A.A. KHAN,
CAROLINE BUISMAN & CHRISTOPHER GOSNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 555-67 (2010).
31
See id. See also Kelly Buchanan, Freedom of Expression and International Criminal Law: An
Analysis of the Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for Journalists, 35 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L.
REV. 609, 650-53 (2004); Anastasia Heeger, Securing a Journalist’s Testimonial Privilege in the
International Criminal Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 209 (2005). But see Megan A. Fairlie, Evidentiary
Privilege of Journalist Reporting in Area of Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 805 (2004) (criticizing the
Randal decision and expressing hope that ICC will not follow the ICTY approach to journalistic privilege).
32
Youm, supra note 12, at 53.
30
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privilege in terms of its regard for the right of the public to receive information gathered
by a watchdog press.33 That press, Youm wrote, relies in part for its effectiveness on
sources’ willingness to share information without fear of having their relationship with
journalists become the subject of compelled testimony.34 Acknowledging the irony,
Youm argued for the exceptional aspects of the Randal case, in particular, to be imported
back into U.S. jurisprudence on reporter’s privilege.35
Meanwhile, other academic discussion of the Randal case has focused on the
rationale given for the journalistic privilege. One writer suggested that ICTY would have
provided a stronger foundation for the journalistic privilege by drawing on the freedom of
expression provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is not
binding, and ICCPR, which is binding on states that are parties to the treaty.36 The ICTY
did mention Article 19 but it was in the context of the public’s right to receive
information.37 The scholarship on international journalistic privilege has yet to discuss in
an extensive way the recent developments, particularly the U.N. Human Rights
Committee’s endorsement of the privilege in General Comment 34, but also ongoing
applications of the privilege in ad hoc war crimes tribunals.38

Prosecutor v. Taylor

33

Id. at 53-54.
Id.
35
Id. at 55-56.
36
Nina Kraut, A Critical Analysis of One Aspect of Randal In Light of International, European,
and American Human Rights Conventions and Case Law, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 337, 354-57
(2004).
37
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38
Khan & Azarnia, supra note 30, at 551-98, discuss some recent journalistic privilege cases in
international tribunals but not General Comment 34.
34
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The Special Court for Sierra Leone, sitting at The Hague, relied heavily on
Goodwin and the Randal case in deciding to protect journalistic privilege in 2009.39 The
case presented the novel question of whether a journalist could refuse to identify
individuals who had assisted in gathering news even though they themselves did not
provide information. The journalist, designated for purposes of the case as TF1-355,
traveled from Liberia to Sierra Leone in his capacity as managing editor of a newspaper
in Monrovia. His passage into Sierra Leone was enabled by members of the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group, a joint military force made up of
soldiers primarily from Nigeria but also other West African nations.40
The journalist, who had gone to Sierra Leone to report on the involvement of the
government of Liberia in Sierra Leone’s civil war, was called to testify before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in the prosecution of former Liberian president Charles Ghankay
Taylor for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In his testimony, TF1-355 refused to
disclose the identity of the soldiers in the monitoring group who had facilitated his entry
to Sierra Leone because, he said, doing so could subject them to danger.41 The Trial
Chamber of the SCSL first concluded that TF1-355’s testimony would be relevant to
Taylor’s defense because Taylor contended that TF1-355 may have been a spy or may
have had connections to arms smuggling by one of the paramilitary groups fighting in
Sierra Leone.42

39

Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on the Defence Motion for the Disclosure of the Identity of a
Confidential ‘Source’ Raised During Cross-Examination of TF1-355, SCSL-03-1-T (Mar. 6, 2009),
available at http://www.worldcourts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/2009.03.06_Prosecutor_v_Taylor.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2016).
40
Id. at ¶ 1.
41
Id.
42
Id. at ¶ 23.
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Notwithstanding the relevance of TF1-355’s requested testimony, the Sierra
Leone court concluded that journalistic privilege applied because TF1-355 made
promises to the soldiers, in his capacity as a journalist, in order to enter Sierra Leone and
pursue journalistic activities.43 Thus, the court interpreted journalistic sources broadly to
include not only those who provide information but also those who otherwise facilitate
journalistic activities. The Trial Chamber relied on language from Goodwin, which
stated that, without a journalistic privilege, “[S]ources may be deterred from assisting the
press and informing the public on matters of interest.”44 The court drew particular
attention to the word “assisting” and said that both sources and facilitators of journalism
should be entitled to be covered by the journalistic privilege, especially in conflict zones.
On this point, the court cited the Randal court and stated that journalists in conflict zones
deal with heightened tensions, threat of violence and difficulty in not only gathering news
but also disseminating it.45
Having concluded that the soldiers who helped TF1-355 cross the border into
Sierra Leone were indeed journalistic sources, the court then considered the question of
whether the identity of those soldiers was sufficiently critical evidence in the prosecution
of Taylor to merit overriding the journalistic privilege. The court concluded that it was
not of “direct and important value in determining a core issue in the case.”46 The court
described this requirement as requiring a compelling reason and a showing that the
evidence was “really significant.”47 The Sierra Leone court added another formulation

43

Id. at ¶ 24.
Id. at 25 (quoting Goodwin).
45
Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9).
46
Id. at ¶ 32.
47
Id. at ¶ 32-33.
44
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that was drawn from a concurring opinion by one of its own members, Justice Geoffrey
Robertson, in a previous case: “[J]ournalistic privilege must yield in cases where the
identification of the source is necessary either to prove guilt, or to prove a reasonable
doubt about guilt.”48 The court then held it did not need to proceed to the second prong,
the question of reasonable alternatives, because the first prong of the test was not met.
One of the most significant passages of the court’s decision deals with the basis
for the journalistic privilege: “The extension of privilege to journalistic sources stems
from the right to freedom of expression and serves to protect the freedom of the press and
the public interest in the free flow of information.”49 For this proposition, the Sierra
Leone court cited Goodwin, the Randal case and language in a earlier concurring opinion
by SCSL Justice Geoffrey Robertson. These authorities suggested freedom of expression
as the basis for journalistic privilege, but each had limitations in terms of endorsing
Article 19 strongly. Goodwin, for example, was decided based on Article 10 of the
European Convention for Human Rights. The ICTY in the Randal case cited Article 19
of ICCPR but that was in the context of a public’s right to receive information rather than
the journalist’s right to gather and convey it. And Justice Robertson’s language in a
concurring opinion was dicta because the case was not about journalistic privilege.50 The
language in Prosecutor v. Taylor directly invokes free expression but does not
specifically name Article 19 as the basis.

48

Id. at ¶ 29 (quoting Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL 04-16-AR73, Decision on Prosecution
Appeal (May 26, 2006) (separate and concurring opinion of Robertson, J.)). It is worth noting that
Robertson served as counsel to Randal in the Brdjanin case. Robertson’s language in Brima about
journalistic privilege was dicta because that case did not involve a journalist but rather a human-rights
worker. See Khan & Azarnia, supra note 30, at 559 n.29.
49
Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-1-T at ¶ 25.
50
See supra note 48.
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As a result, the developing journalistic privilege in international law, as of 2011,
was still only loosely grounded in Article 19 of ICCPR. The journalistic privilege would
be more robust if it were considered part of the fundamental human right of freedom of
expression rather than if classified as a mere evidentiary rule. Certain obligations may
accompany fundamental human rights in the international law system, and among these
are a showing of necessity and proportionality, lack of margin of appreciation and
requirements to respect, protect and fulfill human rights to achieve full realization and not
merely a minimum protection. Some of these obligations are relevant to the journalistic
privilege as a component of free expression in Article 19. These are discussed in greater
detail below with the argument that the obligations are what make the inclusion of
journalistic privilege in General Comment 34 so significant. First, however, a review of
the state of newsgathering protections in the U.N. Human Rights Committee prior to the
Committee’s adoption of General Comment 34 is required.

NEWSGATHERING PROTECTIONS IN UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES
The Human Rights Committee’s Concluding Observations on Kuwait in 2000
demonstrated a high degree of concern over violations of protections for newsgathering.51
Close examination of the Human Rights Committee processes leading to the 2000
Concluding Observations reveals that the specific issue in Kuwait had to do with a
requirement in the country’s press code for journalists facing accusations of defamation.52

51

Human Rights Committee, supra note 3.
See UN Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of the First Part (Public) of the 1854th
Meeting, CCPR/C/SR.1854 (2000), available at
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsm0BTKouD
PNIMXWAuPwondEEm6Yi5F0QSIzfPqOPHyqTdSigLh5AGN622UKg6bZJQ2ubTlGIwLeXCNydb3iaA
aqYLpjOFXkAuXUZVFPYCfHp (last visited May 15, 2017).
52
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According to a representative of Kuwait, “[J]ournalists would be liable for prosecution
unless they could prove that they had acted in good faith on the basis of information from
reliable sources.”53
Kuwait’s own submission to the Human Rights Committee demonstrated how
potentially broad this requirement to reveal sources could be. The country’s report
admitted there was a broad exception to freedom of expression for communication that
“attack[ed] the honour of others.”54 Further, free speech did not protect statements
against God, the head of state of Kuwait, or the heads of other states.55 Kuwait’s law
further required newspapers to obtain licenses and to appoint an owner and editor who
were Kuwaiti citizens living in Kuwait and who would be accountable for the
newspapers’ content — and, by implication, liable for defamation if they could not
produce sources sufficient to prove good faith in case of libel claims.
It was against this backdrop that the Human Rights Committee, in its Concluding
Observations in 2000, raised concerns about Kuwait’s possible violations of ICCPR
Article 19. The committee concluded that the requirement to reveal sources proving
good faith behind a publication could violate not only Article 19’s protection of free
speech but also other provisions of ICCPR with respect to presumption of innocence.56
The committee further urged Kuwait to bring its law in harmony with ICCPR Article 19
so that “every person can enjoy his or her rights . . . without fear of being subjected to

53

Id. at ¶ 12.
UN Human Rights Committee, Initial Report of Kuwait, CCPR/C/120/Add.1 ¶ 237 (1999),
aavailable at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f120%2f
Add.1&Lang=en (last visited May 15, 2017).
55
Id. at ¶ 240.
56
Human Rights Committee, supra note 3 at ¶ 20.
54
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harassment.”57 Finally, the Human Rights Committee said, any exception to free speech
as guaranteed by Article 19 must meet the necessity and proportionality test, a topic
discussed later.

Human Rights Committee Jurisprudence
Other than its Concluding Observations on Kuwait in 2000, the Human Rights
Committee had expounded little if at all on journalistic privilege prior to adoption of
General Comment 34 in 2011. Still, the committee’s jurisprudence evidences a degree of
protection of newsgathering generally. Michael O’Flaherty, a former member of the
committee and the principal drafter of General Comment 34, reviewed many of these
cases in a 2012 article in which he also discusses the drafting history of General
Comment 34.58 In 2007, the committee concluded that Cameroon had violated the freeexpression rights of a journalist under ICCPR Article 19 when the country’s security
forces threatened and physically attacked the journalist for, among other things, failing to
disclose his sources.59
The journalist, Philip Afuson Njaru, was threatened with arrest and torture and
then beaten into unconsciousness by police whom he had accused in news articles of
corruption. When Njaru refused to disclose his sources for articles about police bribery
and torture, a police constable “slapped his face several times, threatened to detain him
for an indefinite time, to parade him naked in front of women and female children, and to

57

Id.
Michael O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34, 124 HUM. RIGHTS L. REV.
627 (2012).
59
Philip Afuson Njaru v. Cameroon, No. 1353/2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1353/2005 (2007),
available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/1353-2005.html (last visited May 16, 2017).
58
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kill him.”60 After he wrote about allegations that members of the navy had mistreated
women and girls, Njaru was again asked for his sources and again he refused. At that
point, “Soldiers told him they would shoot him,” and armed military guards surrounded
his house.61 The committee ordered Cameroon to investigate and prosecute Njaru’s
attackers, protect him from further threats and violence, compensate him, and ensure
similar violations would not occur in the future.62
In another case, the Human Rights Committee concluded that a newspaper
reader’s right to receive information was violated when the government of Uzbekistan
refused to grant a license to the newspaper in question.63 Two members of the committee
disagreed that all news consumers could claim free-expression violations when news
outlets were restricted, evoking the concept of actio popularis.64 That concept, which
holds that an individual member of the public may not represent the entire public in
asserting a claim, would seem to be problematic for newsgathering because journalists
frequently claim to be acting not in their own interests but rather in the public interest
when they seek information. The committee, however, seemed to back away from actio
popularis in a subsequent case.65
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Beyond Human Rights Committee materials, the journalistic privilege has
appeared in several United Nations resolutions, reports and documents. One of those is a
comprehensive 2017 research study and policy paper by the U.N. Education, Scientific
and Cultural Organization titled, “Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age.”66
That report compiles references to the journalistic privilege and statements by U.N. actors
that could support the privilege. The UNESCO study noted that the U.N. Human Rights
Council called for greater protection for journalists and their sources in a 2012 resolution,
and that the council in 2014 decried the government practice of surveillance of journalists
and interceptions of their communications.67 UNESCO also pointed to two U.N. General
Assembly resolutions that did not directly mention the privilege but that discussed, under
the guise of a right to privacy, the importance of protecting newsgathering from
government surveillance.68
Media law scholars in the United States may not consider journalistic privilege
part of the right to privacy, but that argument was made in 2013 by Frank La Rue, then
serving as U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression:
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An environment where surveillance is widespread, and unlimited by due process
or judicial oversight, cannot sustain the presumption of protection of sources. . . .
States cannot ensure that individuals are able to freely seek and receive
information or express themselves without respecting, protecting and promoting
their right to privacy.69

La Rue’s advocacy of the right to privacy as partial basis—along with freedom of
expression — for the journalistic privilege was seconded by UNESCO. In pressing this
case in its 2017 report, UNESCO pointed to statements by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights and various other experts.70

GENERAL COMMENT 34’S ADOPTION OF THE PRIVILEGE
International human rights law has always faced a fundamental challenge to
balance what the United Nations Charter calls “universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights” with state sovereignty.71 In its effort to do this, the United Nations counts
on its General Assembly and Security Council, as well as individual office-holders such
as the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights.72 As a charterbased body, the Human Rights Council is charged with responsibility “to promote
awareness, to foster respect and to respond to violations” of human rights.73 The council
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is made up of forty-seven rotating state members elected to three-year terms, though the
United States and USSR/Russia have been long-standing members. The council is a
political entity whose enforcement of human rights is evident not through punitive legal
measure so much as standards set in international treaties that the council helps develop.
Other ways the council exercises its influence are through publication of country reports
that name bad actors and thematic reports of expert special rapporteurs on specific
human-rights topics. Further, the council implemented in 2006 a system of Universal
Periodic Review, in which all U.N. member states must report to the council about their
records on human rights on approximately five-year cycles.74
To counter the political influences on charter-based bodies such as the Security
Council and Human Rights Council, the international human rights law system also
includes expert monitoring of implementation of nine major treaties. The focus of this
research is on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,75 particularly the
freedom of expression provision in Article 19:

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
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of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with
it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals.76

The expert treaty body that monitors compliance with ICCPR is the Human
Rights Committee. Not to be confused with the Human Rights Council and its Charterbased, political role, the committee has eighteen individual expert members who are to be
“persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human
rights.”77 Committee members serve without significant compensation and are generally
drawn from scholars and legal professionals. They meet three times per year for three
weeks at a time to consider state reports and conduct other business. Each country that
has signed and ratified ICCPR, 168 in all, reports approximately every five years to the
Human Rights Committee. This treaty body reporting requirement is distinct from
Universal Periodic Review discussed above.78
The committee makes Concluding Observations about the state reports, and those
Concluding Observations provide guidance about the meaning of the provisions of
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ICCPR. Another function of the Human Rights Committee is to adjudicate claims by
individuals that member states of ICCPR have violated human rights protected by the
treaty.79 The results of those adjudications are published, similar to judicial opinions, and
also provide guidance about the scope of human rights under ICCPR. The committee has
authority to compile summaries of its Concluding Observations and its adjudications into
General Comments.80 General Comments also may include other Committee guidance
on the procedures and substance relating to the provisions of ICCPR.
The effectiveness of the Human Rights Committee’s work is subject to some
debate. The committee itself has pointed to about two dozen incidents in which nations
have changed their own legislation in order to comply with committee
recommendations.81 Still, it is well-documented that some nations do not comply with
committee guidance, and this has been attributed to misunderstanding, lack of capacity to
do so, insufficient follow-up, lack of political support, lack of enforcement teeth and
simple unwillingness.82 This effectiveness, or enforcement question, is tied to the legal
status of the committee’s work, including General Comments. If General Comments and
other committee statements are not legally binding, then perhaps lack of compliance is
not so alarming.83 But if General Comments are binding, then the committee’s continued
legitimacy depends in part on compliance with their normative statements.
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Commentators disagree about the extent to which General Comments have legal
force. General Comments have been described as mere “secondary soft law
instruments,” but other observers argue that General Comments are “authoritative
interpretations” of treaties such as ICCPR.84 The committee itself describes a General
Comment as a “very useful guide to the normative substance of international human
rights obligations.”85 In practice, General Comments are frequently cited by humanrights advocates in popular media and by legal advocates as persuasive authority in
national and international legal proceedings. Scholars have argued that a General
Comment is “an autonomous and distinct juridical instrument.”86
From 1981 to 2012, the Human Rights Committee published thirty-four General
Comments on ICCPR. One of those, General Comment 10 in 1983, dealt with freedom
of expression and other provisions of Article 19.87 The comment does not mention
journalistic privilege. In fact, it is only one page long and is more procedural than
substantive. For example, states that were parties to ICCPR were asked to provide clear
descriptions in their treaty body reports about the scope of freedom of expression in their
jurisdictions but were not given meaningful substantive guidance.88 By 2009, the
committee determined that it needed to publish a new General Comment on Article 19’s
protections for freedom of expression.
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General Comment 34
Ultimately adopted by the committee in July 2011, General Comment 34 is
thirteen pages long and divided into several categories: freedom of opinion, freedom of
expression, freedom of expression and the media, right of access to information, freedom
of expression and political rights, the application of Article 19(3), limitative scope on
freedom of expression in certain specific areas, and the relationship between Articles 19
and 20.89 At the outset, the document states that freedom of expression accomplishes
three key purposes: it allows self-fulfillment, facilitates democracy, and enables the
enjoyment of other human rights.90 General Comment 34 also gives examples of
freedom of expression that could implicate the journalistic privilege, including political
discourse, commentary on public affairs, discussion of human rights, and journalism.91
The General Comment pays particular attention to the role of news media in
promoting free expression and other human rights.92 Within that focus on the role of
news media, General Comment 34 perceptively identifies several aspects of
newsgathering that merit protection. One of those aspects is access to government
meetings and places.93 Another is access to published or public sources of political
commentary.94 The committee took a strong stand in General Comment 34 against
licensing of journalists and emphasized that journalism is a function that is carried out by
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a variety of individuals and organizations, not just a narrow category of traditional mass
media entities.95
The statement on journalistic privilege came in the context of a discussion about
journalists not being restricted in their movements, “including to conflict-afflicted
locations, the sites of natural disasters and locations where there are allegations of
human-rights abuses.”96 General Comment 34 clearly denotes that the journalistic
privilege, while limited and not absolute, is part of freedom of expression rather than
merely an evidentiary rule. It also merits repeating that, while the privilege is labeled
journalistic, the committee’s definition of a journalist in General Comment 34 is broad
enough to include “bloggers and others who engage in forms of self-publication in print,
on the internet or elsewhere.”97
The actual provision on the privilege says nations that have joined ICCPR “should
recognize and respect that element of the right of freedom of expression that embraces
the limited journalistic privilege not to disclose information sources.”98 The General
Comment does not define in what way the journalistic privilege is limited, and thus the
only conclusion that can be drawn from the text is that the privilege exists but is not
absolute. Its application in a given situation is subject to interpretation of relevant
context. It is significant that the privilege, as defined by the Human Rights Committee,
applies to the function of journalism rather than a formalistic definition of journalists or
journalism organizations. Further, the privilege potentially applies to both confidential
and non-confidential sources of information. The inclusion of the word “limited”
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suggests some kind of balancing test, a topic discussed later in relation to Article 19(3)’s
necessity and proportionality test.
The principal drafter of General Comment 34 was Michael O’Flaherty, an Irish
scholar and former Human Rights Committee member. O’Flaherty wrote later that he
considered General Comment 34 to be a “legal interpretation of Article 19 rather than a
recommendatory or policy-level instrument.”99 He documented the multiple changes to
the text of General Comment 34 through the process of multiple drafts and the input of
non-governmental organizations and various ICCPR member states. Although
O’Flaherty’s article does not discuss the journalistic privilege provision in detail, he
revealed that the freedom of information discussion in General Comment 34 was
substantially strengthened during the drafting process.100 He also wrote that the
committee consciously avoided connecting the freedom of information with the right to
receive information, and the committee consciously rejected the idea of actio
popularis,101 thus making it easier for journalists to assert they are acting in the public
interest when gathering news.

Advantages of an Approach Based on International Human Rights Law
The Human Rights Committee’s decision to include journalistic privilege within
the ambit of Article 19’s protection of free expression is significant. The committee has
yet to develop jurisprudence of its own on the journalistic privilege in disputed claims
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under ICCPR Article 19.102 Although general comments often reiterate previous
statements of the committee in its jurisprudence or Concluding Observations on State
Reports, the fact that the journalistic privilege was included in a General Comment
without such previous development shows that the committee concluded the privilege
merited special emphasis in General Comment 34. As a result, the international law
journalistic privilege is now imbued with “strong moral and political force because of the
expertise of the members of the [Human Rights Committee], and states parties should
follow [the Committee’s guidance].”103
There are three important results of the committee’s decision to include the
journalistic privilege within the free-expression protections of Article 19. First, any
exception to the journalistic privilege would have to meet the strict test of necessity and
proportionality that the Human Rights Committee applies under Article 19(3). Second,
the journalistic privilege is not subject to a margin of appreciation, meaning that nations
may not apply their own cultural and societal standards but rather must follow a single
international standard. Third, the journalistic privilege is subject to the requirement that
nations subject to ICCPR must respect, protect and fulfill the right.
General Comment 34 makes clear that, as a human right under ICCPR, the
journalistic privilege is not subject to being easily restricted. Here it should be recalled
that General Comment 34’s formulation of the privilege is not absolute. Rather, the
privilege is said to be limited. Yet, the General Comment gives no specific indication in
what ways those limits might apply, so one must resort to the text of Article 19 itself. In
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the case of free expression, any restriction must comply with Article 19(3) in that it must
be clearly stated by law, necessary and proportional to the need to protect the rights and
reputations of others or the public order, health or morals.104
O’Flaherty emphasized that any nation attempting to restrict the right to freedom
of expression must demonstrate “a direct and immediate connection between the
expression and the threat.”105 This nexus requirement “sets a high bar for restrictions.”106
It should also be recalled that the only permissible purposes in Article 19(3) to restrict
freedom of expression are “[f]or respect of the rights or reputations of others” and “[f]or
the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or
morals.”107 This is a narrower category of exceptions than some regional human-rights
provisions for free speech, such as in the European Convention on Human Rights.108
The Human Rights Committee applied the necessity and proportionality test in
two cases involving restrictions on journalists. Although the cases did not implicate
journalistic privilege directly, they are nonetheless illustrative of the high bar that would
have to be met for a state party to ICCPR to permissibly restrict the journalistic privilege.
In one of the cases, a Yugoslav journalist was convicted of criminal insult for accusing a
factory manager and Socialist Party leader of squandering his company’s money on
personal and political causes before insincerely styling himself a reformer.109 Although
Serbia and Montenegro contended that the conviction was necessary to protect the rights
and reputation of the official in question, the Human Rights Committee ultimately
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concluded that this was not the case because the subject of the journalist’s reportage was
a “prominent public and political figure.”110 The committee further stated “that in
circumstances of public debate in a democratic society, especially in the media,
concerning figures in the public domain, the value placed by the Covenant upon
uninhibited expression is particularly high.”111
In the 2006 case Bodrožić v. Serbia and Montenegro, the committee made clear
that the asserted justification — protecting the rights or reputation of a public figure —
was not necessary in accordance with the requirement of Article 19(3). But even if it had
been a necessary purpose, the criminal punishment was not proportional to the interest
asserted, according to the Committee.112 In a similar case from Angola, the Human
Rights committee also found a violation of Article 19 when a journalist was jailed for
criticizing the country’s president and accusing him of corruption.113 In that case, the
committee gave a detailed explanation of the necessity and proportionality test:

The Committee observes that the requirement of necessity implies an element of
proportionality, in the sense that the scope of the restriction imposed on freedom
of expression must be proportional to the value which the restriction serves to
protect. Given the paramount importance, in a democratic society, of the right to
freedom of expression and of a free and uncensored press or other media, the
severity of the sanctions imposed on the author cannot be considered as a
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proportionate measure to protect public order or the honour and the reputation of
the President, a public figure who, as such, is subject to criticism and
opposition.114

Article 19’s journalistic privilege also is not subject to a “margin of appreciation”
that would allow a nation some leeway in determining when limitations on human rights
are necessary.115 The margin of appreciation, or margin of discretion, could in the
context of Article 19(3) give a member state of ICCPR some deference in determining
what is necessary to protect the rights of others or public order.116 But General Comment
34 emphasizes there is no margin of appreciation for free expression, and thus all
member states must treat journalistic privilege in an equally protective manner. The
inclusion of journalistic privilege as an element of free expression rather than a mere
evidentiary rule is thus important because nations could not invoke the margin of
appreciation as an excuse to limit the privilege in an unjustified way.
O’Flaherty noted that in a 1982 case, the Human Rights Committee granted
Finland a margin of appreciation to determine what constituted “public morals.”117 Later,
however, the Human Rights Committee backed away from the margin of appreciation
and, even more clearly, completely rejected it in General Comment 34. In that document,
the committee stated that “the scope of this freedom is not to be assessed by reference to
a ‘margin of appreciation.’”118 That discussion came in the context of the state
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requirement to demonstrate necessity when restricting freedom of expression, and
therefore General Comment 34 definitively clarifies that states may not resort to their
own interpretations of the meaning of public morals, public order, public health, national
security or rights and reputations of others. Instead, those phrases must be given their
international-law meaning even though individual nations might have their own internal
understandings.119
As a part of free expression under Article 19, the journalistic privilege also enjoys
the benefit of state obligations to respect, protect, ensure and fulfill the right. The
responsibility to respect means that a state recognizes the right, conducts itself in
accordance with the recognition by refraining from violating the right and encourages
other states to respect the right as well.120 Meanwhile, the responsibility to protect means
states must take affirmative steps to prevent third parties from violating human rights.121
General Comment 34 emphasizes that, to meet their obligations under ICCPR, states
must act to stop private persons and entities from infringing on freedom of expression.122
That is the meaning behind the responsibility to ensure. Finally, the responsibility to
fulfill means states must take actions within their power to achieve the full realization of
human rights, rather than just to meet a minimum threshold.123
The full realization of human rights is a lofty — some say unachievable — goal.
But others argue that any goal short of full realization is not sufficient. Full realization of
human rights also involves economic, social and cultural rights, which are embodied in
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an international convention separate from the ICCPR called the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Full realization also means international
assistance and cooperation.124 For purposes of the journalistic privilege, perhaps the most
important point here is that working toward full realization means that states must afford
the right to everyone within their borders and not just citizens. Further, states must do
what they can to promote the right within the borders of other states. While the
journalistic privilege in international law has advanced significantly in the last few years,
some unanswered questions remain. Some of those questions are treated in the next
section.

FUTURE OF JOURNALISTIC PRIVILEGE
The journalistic privilege in international law is still developing. In late 2016, the
U.N. Human Rights Council built on previous work by the Human Rights Committee
with respect to the journalistic privilege. In a resolution on the safety of journalists, the
council stated that nations should “protect in law and in practice the confidentiality of
journalists’ sources.”125 The privilege, according to the council, is an important part of
journalists’ role to promote “government accountability and an inclusive and peaceful
society.”126 As such, the council urged nations not to impose limitations on the
journalistic privilege unless they were clearly spelled out in national law and were
necessary to accomplish an overriding state objective.
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Even with this important recognition by the Human Rights Council, the
journalistic privilege in international law has yet to be fully defined. As it is, several
issues are likely to be addressed. Paramount among these is the definition of a journalist
or how to determine who is entitled to the privilege. Two scholars distinguished between
an “information-based” journalistic privilege and a “profession-based” privilege.127
These authors describe the Randal case as having made an information-based argument
for a profession-based privilege,128 but the reality is the journalistic privilege includes
both information and profession aspects. The key is not whether the privilege protects
information given to journalists or the journalists themselves. It must protect both. The
key to defining when the privilege is present, however, is process-oriented. In other
words, the journalistic privilege is necessary when a source gives information to someone
doing journalism, or a source facilitates the obtaining of information by someone doing
journalism, and the receiver intends to use the information in gathering or presenting
news.
This functional definition of the privilege does not emphasize information over
the identity of the journalist. Nor does it emphasize the journalist’s employment status
over the information communicated from a source to a journalist. Instead, it emphasizes
the function or process of journalism, which includes both information and a person who
communicates news. In reality, this is what the international law cases discussed herein
have recognized. In Goodwin, the European Court of Human Rights did not rely solely
on the fact that the journalist worked for a news organization nor the fact that he obtained
company financial documents from a confidential source. The journalistic privilege was
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upheld because both of those factors were present along with the intent of the journalist
to publish information about the financial woes of the company Tetra.
In the Randal case, the situation was slightly different because the source,
Brdjanin, was also the subpoena proponent. Thus, granting the privilege to Randal did
not protect the source but rather the journalist and the information the journalist could
obtain in the future from sources. But the journalist might not be able to obtain that
information if sources assumed the journalist would be subject to testifying in court. The
key consideration was to protect the journalistic function in the future. In the Special
Court for Sierra Leone case Prosecutor v. Taylor, the sources being protected did not
themselves provide information but rather facilitated the journalist to enter Sierra Leone
to gather information. Yet, if the journalist had been forced to disclose the identities of
the soldiers of the Economic Community of west African States monitoring Group, future
would-be helpers to journalists could be deterred. Again, the key was that the journalist
intended to publish the information obtained. Future courts considering the international
law journalistic privilege should focus on the function or process, not only the
information or the professional status of the journalist.
Another issue likely needing resolution is what to do about voluntary journalistic
testimony.129 Some scholars contend that journalists who volunteer to testify undermine
the journalistic privilege because voluntary testimony poses the same risk to journalistic
functions as involuntary testimony would.130 This may be true unless the source actually
releases the journalist from any promise of confidentiality. Future sources should
recognize they have a choice to allow the journalist to give testimony, and thus they
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would not be deterred in the same way as if the testimony were forced against a
journalist’s wishes. The Council of Europe implicitly recognized this in 2016.131
Still, journalists should be careful. Even answering questions about their
published work could constitute a waiver of the privilege.132 The journalist in the Taylor
case voluntarily testified against the former Liberian president in his war-crimes
prosecution but did not want to reveal the identity of the monitoring group soldiers.
Although the Special Court for Sierra Leone upheld the privilege in that circumstance,
other courts could determine that a journalist waives any claim to privilege by agreeing to
testify at all. Journalists are sometimes asked just to confirm the accuracy of statements
contained in a published or broadcast news account, but that could open the door to
waiver of the privilege.
One of the most important issues for the international law journalistic privilege’s
well-being is that courts continue to recognize its proper origin. As a part of the
fundamental human right of free expression, journalistic privilege enjoys the important
status granted to provisions of ICCPR. As a human right, journalistic privilege is not
subject to a margin of appreciation. It benefits from state responsibility to respect,
protect, ensure and fulfill. The privilege may be overridden only if the necessity and
proportionality test is met. These benefits will continue to accrue as long as future courts
follow the lead of the Human Rights Committee in General Comment 34 to plant the
journalistic privilege firmly in the core of free expression under Article 19.
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In recent years, regional human rights tribunals, such as the European Court of
Human Rights, have shown strong inclinations to protect journalists’ sources. This was
made clear in several recent cases in the Netherlands, including when the Grand Chamber
articulated the rationale behind journalistic privilege and made clear that the effects of
breaching journalistic privilege threaten to harm the free flow of information. There is
some evidence of growing respect for the privilege in regional legal bodies in Africa, the
Americas and Asia as well.133 Meanwhile, even the U.N. Human Rights Committee,
while lacking substantial jurisprudence on the privilege, encapsulated the privilege in a
legal interpretation of Article 19, in the form of General Comment 34, and protected
newsgathering zealously in cases such as Bodrožić and Rafael Marques de Morais v.
Angola.
While all of this bodes well for the future of the international-law journalistic
privilege, world events and the advances of technology pose significant challenges just as
the privilege is becoming established firmly in international human rights law. A major
UNESCO report in 2017 warned that anti-terrorism and national security legislation,
government surveillance, and data retention and disclosure requirements all could
undermine journalistic privilege.134 The concerns about the impact of surveillance on the
privilege also have been voiced by the U.N.’s Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion.135 The UNESCO report
noted the particularly acute impact on women journalists and sources when the privilege
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is undermined, due to gender factors involved in face-to-face meetings when online
communication is compromised by surveillance as well as the gender-specific factors in
online harassment.136 Finally, the UNESCO study proposed a comprehensive eleven-part
legal framework for development and review of national journalistic privilege
standards.137

CONCLUSION
The justice system relies for its success on the ability of litigants to obtain as
much relevant evidence as possible even against the wishes, sometimes, of those who
possess it. Yet the law recognizes that the function in some relationships — lawyerclient, doctor-patient, priest-penitent, to name a few — are so important that not even a
legal proceeding should interfere by forcing compelled testimony about privileged
communications. Although a journalist-source relationship may not rise to the level of
lawyers and their clients or doctors and their patients, the function of journalism is
nonetheless critical to the success of a democratic society and, thus, journalist-source
communications should enjoy a qualified privilege. International law has recognized
this. The journalistic privilege in international law is still developing but, thus far, it
provides qualified yet robust protection for both confidential and non-confidential
communications.
This article has reviewed recent and important cases in international law
proceedings in which journalistic privilege has been upheld. These cases – in regional
tribunals, war crimes tribunals, and in the U.N. Human Rights Committee – form a basis
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on which the international law privilege may continue to develop even as national
security concerns, surveillance and data-gathering and retention policies pose challenges.
The Human Rights Committee’s Concluding Observations on Kuwait, as well as its
judgment against Cameroon in the Njaru case, demonstrate the frequent link between
journalistic privilege and broader free-press protections. In those cases, journalists were
threatened or attacked for refusing to disclose their sources on reporting about matters of
public interest, including possible government wrongdoing. The public watchdog role of
journalists is more critical than ever, and journalists’ sources need to know legal
protections exist if they are to continue ensuring the free flow of information.
The article also has identified that the journalistic privilege took a significant step
forward in international law when the Human Rights Committee included the privilege in
is General Comment 34 on Article 19 of ICCPR. General Comment 34 makes clear that
journalistic privilege is not a mere evidentiary rule but rather lies at the heart of freedom
of expression. This endorsement allows the journalistic privilege to more likely survive
any state attempts to undermine it. The privilege is not absolute but will give journalists
and their sources assurance that ultimately benefits the public interest in the free flow of
vital information.
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